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Summary
The continued rise in the U.S.-China trade imbalance and complaints from  U.S.
manufacturing firms and workers over the competitive challenges posed by Chinese
imports have led several Members to call for a more aggressive U.S. stance against
certain Chinese trade policies they deem to be unfair.  Among these is China’s refusal
to adopt a floating exchange rate system.  From 1994-July 2005, China pegged its
currency (renminbi or  yuan) to the U.S. dollar at about 8.28 yuan to the dollar.  On
July 21, 2005, China announced it would immediately appreciate its currency to the
dollar by 2.1% (to 8.11 yuan per dollar) and link its currency to a basket of currencies
(rather than just to the dollar).  Many Members contend that China “manipulates” its
currency in order to give its firms an unfair trade advantage, and that this has led to
U.S. job losses.  Several bills have been  introduced in Congress to address China’s
currency policy, including S. 295, which would impose 27.5% in additional tariffs
on imported Chinese goods unless it appreciated its currency to market levels.  
If the yuan is undervalued against the dollar, there are likely to be both benefits
and costs to the U.S. economy.  It would mean that imported Chinese goods are
cheaper than they would be if the yuan were market determined.  This lowers prices
for U.S. consumers and dampens inflationary pressures.  It also lowers prices for U.S.
firms that use imported inputs (such as parts) in their production, making such firms
more competitive. When the U.S. runs a trade deficit with the Chinese, this requires
a capital inflow from China to the United States.  This, in turn, lowers U.S. interest
rates and increases U.S. investment spending.  On the negative side, lower priced
goods from China may hurt U.S. industries that compete with those products,
reducing their production and employment.  In addition, an undervalued yuan makes
U.S. exports to China more expensive, thus reducing the level of U.S. exports to
China and job opportunities for U.S. workers in those sectors.  However, in the long
run, trade can affect only the composition of employment, not its overall level.  Thus,
inducing China to appreciate its currency would likely benefit some U.S. economic
sectors, but would harm others, including U.S. consumers.  Several estimates of the
yuan’s undervaluation are evaluated in the report.
Critics of China’s currency policy point to the large and growing U.S. trade
deficit ($202 billion in 2005) with China as evidence that the yuan is undervalued
and harmful to the U.S. economy.  The relationship is more complex, for a number
of reasons.  First, while China runs a large trade surplus with the United States, it
runs a large trade deficit with the rest of the world.  Second, an increasing level of
Chinese exports are from foreign-invested companies in China that have shifted
production there to take advantage of China’s abundant low cost labor.  Third, the
deficit masks the fact that China has become one of the fastest growing markets for
U.S. exports.  Finally, the trade deficit with China accounted for 24% of the sum of
total U.S. bilateral trade deficits in 2005, indicating that the overall trade deficit is not
caused by the exchange rate policy of one country, but rather the shortfall between
U.S. saving and investment.  That being said, there are a number of valid economic
arguments for China to adopt a more flexible currency policy.  This report will be
updated as events warrant.
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China’s Currency:  Economic Issues and
Options for U.S. Trade Policy
Unlike most developed economies, such as the United States, China does not
allow its currency to float, i.e., let its exchange rates be determined by market forces.
Instead, from 1994 until July 21, 2005, China maintained a policy of pegging its
currency (the renminbi or yuan) to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of roughly 8.28
yuan to the dollar.  The Chinese central bank maintained this peg by buying (or
selling) as many dollar-denominated assets in exchange for newly printed yuan as
needed to eliminate excess demand (supply) for the yuan.  As a result, the exchange
rate between the yuan and the dollar basically stayed the same, despite changing
economic factors which could have otherwise caused the yuan to either appreciate or
depreciate relative to the dollar.  Under a floating exchange rate system, the relative
demand for the two countries’ goods and assets would determine the exchange rate
of the yuan to the dollar. Many economists contend that for the first several years of
the peg, the fixed value was likely close to the market value.  But in the past few
years, economic conditions have changed such that the yuan would likely have
appreciated if it had been floating.  The sharp increase in China’s foreign exchange
reserves (which grew  from $403 billion at the end of 2003 to $865 billion at the end
of March 2005), in part, prevented this from happening.  
The Chinese government modified its currency policy on July 21, 2005.  It
announced that the yuan’s exchange rate would become “adjustable, based on market
supply and demand with reference to exchange rate movements of currencies in a
basket” (it was later announced that the composition of the basket includes the dollar,
the yen, the euro, and a few other currencies).  Further, it announced that the
exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the yuan would be immediately adjusted
from 8.28 to 8.11, an appreciation of about 2.1%.  Unlike a true floating exchange
rate, the yuan would (according to the Chinese government) be allowed to fluctuate
by no more than 0.3% on a daily basis against the basket.  It does not appear that the
Chinese intended to allow these exchange rate movements to accumulate, however,
because the yuan has appreciated only about 1% against the dollar since the July
2005 reforms were initiated (through April 3, 2006), according to the Bank of China.
It also does not appear that the other currencies are given a significant weight in the
basket since the yuan has tracked the dollar’s value so closely, whereas currencies
like the Japanese yen have changed in value against the dollar since 2005.  This
indicates that the Chinese government is still keeping the value of its currency close
to fixed against the dollar.   
The Chinese government initially hinted that further reforms would be made
over time, but later ruled out making further revaluations in the near future.  This
situation has raised concerns in the United States, but the Chinese, with concerns
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1 A brief summary of this report can be found in CRS Report RS21625, China’s Currency:
A Summary of the Economic Issues, by Wayne Morrison and Marc Labonte.
2 See Prepared Remarks of Dr. C. Fred Bergsten, President, Institute for International
Economics, before the House Small Business Committee, June 25, 2003.
about their own economy, have been reluctant to make significant changes to their
currency.1
This paper attempts to review the various economic issues raised by China’s
present currency policy.  Major topics surveyed include 
! The economic concerns raised by the United States over China’s
currency policy and China’s concerns over changing that policy.
! How China’s fixed exchange rate regime works and the various
economic studies that have attempted to determine China’s real, or
market, exchange rate.
! Trends and factors in the U.S.-China trade imbalance (What is
causing it? Is China’s currency policy to blame?).
! Economic consequences of China’s currency policy for both China
and the United States.
! Policy options on how the United States might induce China to
reform its present currency policy, including current legislation
introduced in Congress.
U.S. Concerns Over China’s Currency Policy and
Recent Action
Many U.S. policymakers, business people, and labor representatives have
charged that China’s currency is significantly undervalued vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar
by as much as 40%, making Chinese exports to the United States cheaper, and U.S.
exports to China more expensive, than they would be if exchange rates were
determined by market forces. They further argue that the undervalued currency has
contributed to the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit with China (which has risen from
$30 billion in 1994 to $202 billion in 2005) and has hurt U.S. production and
employment in several U.S. manufacturing sectors (such as textiles and apparel and
furniture) that are forced to compete domestically and internationally against
“artificially” low-cost goods from China.   Furthermore, many analysts contend that
China’s currency policy induces other East Asian countries to intervene in currency
markets in order to keep their currencies weak against the dollar to remain
competitive with Chinese goods.2  Several groups are pressing the Bush
Administration to pressure China either to revalue its currency or to allow it to float
freely in international markets.  These issues are addressed in more detail later in the
report.  
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3 U.S. Treasury Department, Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange
Rate Policies, November 2005.
President Bush and Administration officials have criticized China’s currency
policy on a number of occasions, stating that exchange rates should be determined
by market forces.  Initially, the Bush Administration rejected calls from several
Members of Congress to apply direct pressure on China to force it to abandon its
currency peg.  Instead, the Administration sought to encourage China to reform its
financial system, such as under the auspices of a joint technical cooperation program
agreed to on October 14, 2003, and take other measures that would pave the way
toward adopting a more flexible currency policy.  
The Administration’s position on China’s currency peg appears to have
toughened in April 2005 when U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow asserted at a G-7
meeting (on April 16th) that “China is ready now to adopt a more flexible exchange
rate.”  This was likely driven in part by growing complaints from Members over
China’s currency policy and the introduction of numerous currency bills.  On April
6, 2005, the Senate failed (by a vote of 33 to 67) to reject an amendment (S.Amdt.
309) attached by Senator Schumer to  S. 600 (a foreign relations authorization bill),
which would have imposed a 27.5% tariff on Chinese goods if China failed to
substantially appreciate its currency to market levels.  In response to the outcome of
the vote, the Senate leadership negotiated an agreement with the supporters of the bill
to allow a vote on S. 295 (which was sponsored by Senator Schumer and which has
same language as S.Amdt. 309) at a later date as long as the sponsors of the
amendment agree not to offer similar amendments to other bills for the duration of
the 109th Congress (see section on legislation).  In its May 17, 2005 report on
exchange rate policies, the Treasury Department stated that China’s currency peg
policy was a substantial distortion and posed a “risk to its economy, China’s trading
partners, and global economic growth,” and that “China is now ready to move to a
more flexible exchange rate and should move now.”  The report noted that China had
“committed to push ahead firmly and steadily to a market-based exchange rate and
is taking concrete steps to bring about exchange rate flexibility.”   
U.S. Treasury officials praised China’s July 2005 currency reforms.  However,
the Treasury Department’s November 28, 2005 exchange rate policies report to
Congress stated that China had failed to fully implement its commitment to make its
new exchange rate mechanism more flexible and to increase the role of  market
forces to determine the yuan’s value.  The report further stated that China’s new
managed float exchange rate regime, based on market supply and demand with
reference to a basket of currencies (as described by Chinese officials), did not appear
to play a significant role in determining the daily closing level of the yuan (renminbi),
and that trading behavior since the reforms strongly suggested that “the new
mechanism remains, in practice, a tightly managed currency peg against the dollar.”3
However, Treasury decided not to cite China as a currency manipulator under U.S.
trade law because of assurances it had received from Chinese officials that China was
committed to “enhanced, market-determined currency flexibility” and that it would
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4 The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act requires the Treasury Department to
determine “whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and
the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustment
or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.”  
5 Since, 1997, China has reportedly eliminated over 60 million jobs in the state sector.
Layoffs over the past few years has averaged two million annually.  See, Morgan Stanley,
Global Economic Forum, The Coming Rebalancing of the Chinese Economy, March 27,
2006.  
6 Chinese officials contend that during the Asian crisis, when several other nations sharply
devalued their currencies, China “held the line” by not devaluing its currency (which might
have prompted a new round of destructive devaluations across Asia).  This policy was
highly praised by U.S. officials, including President Clinton. 
put greater emphasis on promoting domestic sources of growth, including financial
reform.4
China’s Concerns Over Changing 
Its Currency Policy
Chinese officials argue that its currency policy is not meant to promote exports
or discourage imports.  They claim that China adopted its currency peg to the dollar
in order to foster economic stability and investor confidence, a policy that is practiced
by a variety of developing countries.  Chinese officials have expressed concern that
abandoning the current currency policy could spark an economic crisis in China and
would especially be damaging to its export industries at a time when painful
economic reforms (such as closing down inefficient state-owned enterprises) are
being implemented.5   In addition, Chinese officials also appear to be worried about
the rising level of unrest in the rural areas, where incomes have failed to keep up with
those in urban areas and public anger has spread over government land seizures and
corruption.  Chinese officials contend that appreciating the currency could diminish
domestic food prices (because of increased imports)  and reduce agricultural exports
(by raising prices in overseas markets), thus lowering the income of farmers and
further raising tensions. They further contend that the Chinese banking system is too
underdeveloped and burdened with heavy debt to be able to deal effectively with
possible speculative pressures that could occur with a fully convertible currency,
which typically accompanies a floating exchange rate.  The combination of a
convertible currency and poorly regulated financial system is seen to be one of the
causes of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.6  Prior to the crisis, Chinese officials
were reportedly considering moving towards reforming their currency policy, but the
severe negative economic impact among several East Asian countries that had a
floating currency appears to have convinced officials that China’s currency peg was
one of the main reasons why China’s economy was relatively immune from crisis,
and that keeping the peg was important to maintain stable economic growth.  The
economics of a fixed exchange regime is examined in the next section.
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Rate Policies, November 28, 2005.
8 Prior to this time, China maintained a dual exchange rate system: an official exchange rate
of about 5.8 yuan to the dollar and a market swap rate (used mainly for trade transactions)
of about 8.7 yuan to the dollar (at the end of 1993).   The reforms in 1994 unified the two
rates.  Since Hong Kong also fixes its exchange rate to the dollar, China in effect also
maintains a fixed exchange rate with Hong Kong.
The Economics of Fixed Exchange Rates
How China’s Currency Policy Operates.  Although China claims to have
changed its currency policy from one pegged to the U.S. dollar, to a managed float
based on a basket of currencies, it appears to still be more or less pegged to the
dollar.7  Under this system,  the Chinese central bank buys or sells as much currency
as is needed to keep the yuan-dollar exchange rate constant at level (formerly at about
8.3 yuan per dollar, and  as of April 3, 2006, at around 8.1).8  The primary alternative
to this arrangement would be a floating exchange rate, as the U.S. maintains with the
Euro area, in which supply and demand in the marketplace causes the euro-dollar
exchange rate to continually fluctuate.  Under a floating exchange rate system, the
relative demand for the two countries’ goods and assets would determine the
exchange rate of the yuan to the dollar.  If the demand for Chinese goods or assets
increased, more yuan would be demanded to purchase those goods and assets, and
the yuan would rise in value (if the central bank kept the supply of yuan constant) to
restore equilibrium.   
When a fixed exchange rate is equal in value to the rate that would prevail in the
market if it were floating, the central bank does not need to take any action to
maintain the peg.  However, over time economic circumstances change, and with
them change the relative demand for a country’s currency.  If the Chinese had
maintained a floating exchange rate, appreciation would likely have occurred in the
past few years for a number of reasons.  For instance, productivity and quality
improvements in China may have increased the relative demand for Chinese goods
and foreign direct investment in China.  For the exchange rate peg to be maintained
when economic circumstances have changed requires the central bank to supply or
remove as much currency as is needed to bring supply back in line with market
demand, which it does by increasing or decreasing foreign exchange reserves. This
is shown in the following accounting identity, used to record a country’s
international balance of payments:
Current Account Balance = Capital Account Balance
[(Exports-Imports) + Net Investment
Income+ Net Unilateral Transfers]
 = [(Private Capital Outflow-Inflow) +
Change in Foreign Exchange Reserves]
Net investment income and net unilateral transfers are small, so the current account
balance is close to the trade balance (exports less imports).  Thus, anytime net
exports (exports less imports) or net private capital inflows (private capital inflows
less outflows) increase, foreign exchange reserves must increase by an equivalent
amount to maintain the exchange rate peg. This is the current situation for the
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9 Only data on overall Chinese foreign reserves are publicly available.  Data are not
available to determine how much of the increase in foreign reserves comes from the
accumulation of assets of other countries (e.g., Japan or the Euro area).  If the increase in
foreign reserves came from the purchase of non-U.S. assets, the increase would play no role
in the defense of the exchange rate peg.  By comparing Chinese foreign reserve data to data
reported by the U.S. Treasury on total U.S. assets purchased by China (from private and
official sources), an upper bound of China’s reserves held in U.S. securities is $257 billion
of U.S. Treasury securities at the end of 2005 and $106 billion of U.S. agency debt (as of
June 2004).  Therefore, more than half of the central bank’s holdings were not U.S. assets.
The upper bound is probably too high since it assumes all U.S. assets were bought by the
central bank.  Source: U.S. Treasury “Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S.
Securities,” June 2004; U.S. Treasury International Capital System.
10 If the demand for yuan relative to dollars were to decline, the central bank would face the
opposite situation.  It would need to buy yuan from the public in exchange for U.S. dollars
to maintain the peg.  This strategy could only be continued until the central bank’s dollar
reserves were exhausted, at which point the peg would have to be abandoned.
Chinese central bank.  At the prevailing exchange rate peg, there is excess demand
for yuan (equivalently, excess supply of dollars).  For the central bank to maintain the
peg, it must increase its foreign reserves by buying dollars from the public in
exchange for newly printed yuan.  As seen in Table 1, foreign reserves grew from
$22 billion in 1993, to $168 billion in 2000, to $819 billion at year-end 2005 (and
to $865 billion at the end of March 2006).  About half of these reserves, at a
minimum, are non-U.S. assets.9  China’s foreign exchange holdings rose by 49% in
2004 (over the previous year) and by 34% in 2005.  As long as the Chinese are
willing to accumulate dollar reserves, they can continue to maintain the peg.10  Rather
than hold U.S. dollars, which earn no interest, the Chinese central bank mostly holds
U.S. financial securities — primarily U.S. Treasury securities, but also likely U.S.
Agency securities (e.g., the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
CRS-7
Table 1.  China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves 
and Overall Current Account Surplus:  1990-2005
Year
Cumulative foreign exchange reserves
Current account
balance 
Billions of $ % of GDP % of imports Billions of $
1990 29.6 7.6 54.9 11.9
1991 43.7 10.8 68.4 13.1
1992 20.6 4.3 25.2 6.2
1993 22.4 3.7 21.6 -11.7
1994 52.9 9.8 45.8 6.5
1995 75.4 10.8 57.1 1.3
1996 107.0 13.1 77.1 5.6
1997 142.8 15.9 100.4 32.5
1998 149.2 15.8 106.4 31.2
1999 157.7 15.9 95.1 21.1
2000 168.3 15.6 74.8 20.5
2001 215.6 18.1 88.5 17.5
2002 291.1 23.5 98.6 35.4
2003 403.3 28.1 97.7 31.4
2004 609.9 38.5 108.6 58.7
2005 818.9 36.1 124.1 116.1
Source:  Economist Intelligence Unit, International Monetary Fund, and People’s Bank of China.
The currency basket which the Chinese adopted in July 2005 works similarly,
except the yuan is now theoretically fixed against the (weighted) average value of the
currencies in its “basket”: primarily the dollar, euro, yen, and Korean won.  The exact
weights of the currencies in the basket has not been announced.  Theoretically, this
means that the yuan would no longer be fixed to the dollar, since every time the other
exchange rates in the basket appreciate or depreciate against the dollar, so will the
yuan, but to a lesser extent.  Thus, fixing the yuan to a basket of currencies does not
rule out the possibility that the yuan could appreciate against the dollar (anytime the
other currencies in the basket appreciate against the dollar).  In practice, the yuan has
changed in value very little against the dollar (see Figure 1) when the other
currencies in the basket have changed in value vis-a-vis the dollar since July 2005,
which casts doubt on China’s claim that it has fixed the yuan to a basket (unless it is
a basket that is overwhelmingly weighted to the dollar).  While the euro-dollar
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exchange rate has changed little since July 2005, the yen has depreciated about 4%
against the dollar over that time.
Source:  Federal Reserve.
Note:  Exchange rates plotted in the chart are daily values.
But maintaining a peg is not the only reason the Chinese government could be
accumulating foreign exchange reserves.  Foreign exchange reserves are necessary
to finance international trade (in the presence of capital controls) and to fend off
speculation against one’s currency.  One would expect a country to increase its
foreign reserves for these purposes as its economy and trade grew.  However, Table
1 illustrates that the increase in foreign exchange reserves in China has significantly
outpaced the growth of GDP or imports in the last few years.   
Ironically, speculation that the yuan would be revalued may have forced the
Chinese central bank to accumulate even more reserves than they otherwise would
have in the past few years.  If investors believed that a revaluation of the yuan would
soon occur, then they could profit by purchasing Chinese assets (popularly referred
to as “hot money”), since those assets would be worth more in the investor’s home
currency after a revaluation.  Returning to the equation on page 5, one can see that
for any given trade balance, if private capital flows increase (putting upward pressure
on the yuan), then official foreign reserves must also increase to keep the exchange
rate constant.  Since there are capital controls limiting private capital flows in China,
it is not clear how well such a phenomenon could be measured.  In any case, there is
no way to differentiate between “speculative” and “non-speculative” capital flows.
Nevertheless, data from the IMF provide evidence that is supportive of the
hypothesis.  In 2001, $3 billion of private portfolio capital flowed out of China, while
in 2004 $82 billion flowed into China.  To place that data in perspective, foreign












Figure 1.  The Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate Before and After the July
2005 Announcement
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11 2004 and 2005 data are estimates.  Private portfolio capital flows are measured as
portfolio investment, short-term capital, valuation changes, exceptional financing, and net
errors and omissions.  Some analysts have argued that some speculative flows are likely to
be recorded in errors and omissions since capital controls require them to be made covertly.
For more information, see Eswar Prasad and Shang-Jin Wei, “The Chinese Approach to
Capital Inflows: Patterns and Possible Explanations,” IMF working paper 05/79, April 2005.
12 Some commentators have suggested that the extent of yuan undervaluation can be
estimated from inflation differentials.  In other words, although the nominal exchange rate
has been constant, adjusting for inflation can determine how much the real rate has
depreciated, and proves that the yuan is undervalued.  The problem with this approach is
that the estimate will be highly sensitive to the selection of the base year.  For example, if
the base year was 1996, the yuan would have been undervalued by 14% in 2002, but if the
base year was 1994, the yuan would have been overvalued by 5% in 2002.  The current
account balance was close to zero (one definition of equilibrium) in both years.
capital inflows rather than the trade surplus.  In 2005, inflows fell to $38 billion,
perhaps because speculation subsided following the July revaluation.11
Economic activity, including the level of imports and exports, is not determined
by the nominal exchange rate, but by the real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rate.
Because the United States and China have had roughly similar increases in the
overall price levels since 1994 (39% in China vs. 31% in the United States), the
difference between the real and nominal rate has been small between 1994 and 2003.
However, China had much higher inflation than the United States from 1994-1997,
so the real and nominal exchange rates diverged considerably during that time.  The
real exchange rate appreciated from China’s perspective, making their exports more
expensive and U.S. imports cheaper.  Since then, the real and nominal exchange rates
have converged because China’s inflation rate has been lower than U.S. inflation in
the past few years.  This can be seen in Figure 2.  In 2003, the Chinese exchange rate
reached its lowest level since 1994 in real terms, from the Chinese perspective,
making their exports progressively less expensive since 1997.  It rose slightly in 2004
and 2005.12
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government securities to take the additional yuan out of circulation (called “sterilized
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in recent years.  All else equal, if China sterilized its intervention, the growth rate of the
money supply and the inflation rate would not rise.  The growth rate of one measure of the
Chinese money supply, M2, accelerated in both 2001 and 2002.  The growth rate of another
measure, M1, decelerated in 2001 but accelerated in 2002.  Inflation was very low through
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Source:  CRS calculations based on IMF data.
Note:  Real exchange adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.  Charted is inverted for
illustrative purposes.
In the long run, real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rates return to their market
value whether they are (nominally) fixed or floating.  Imagine that the demand for
Chinese goods and services were to increase.  If the yuan were floating, it would
appreciate, as more yuan were acquired to purchase Chinese goods.  It would
continue to appreciate until the excess demand for Chinese goods was exhausted
(since they are now more expensive in terms of foreign currency), at which point the
trade balance would return to its equilibrium level.  With a fixed exchange rate, the
real exchange rate returns to its market value through price adjustment instead, which
takes time.  If the exchange rate were fixed below the level that would prevail in the
market, Chinese exports would be relatively inexpensive and U.S. imports would be
relatively expensive.  As long as this situation prevailed, the trade surplus with the
United States would persist.  The trade surplus (plus net remittances) is equal to the
capital flowing from China to the United States.  Part of this capital consists of the
purchase of U.S. assets by private Chinese citizens.  The other portion consists of the
accumulation of dollar reserves by the Chinese central bank.  By increasing its dollar
reserves, the central bank is also increasing the supply of yuan.  This causes the
























Figure 2.  Nominal and Real Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate, 1994-2005
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2003, but rose to 3.9% in 2004.  However, inflation and money growth could have been
affected by factors other than reserve accumulation in recent years.  It has been argued that
sterilization is an “unfair” practice to use with a peg, since it is meant to prevent the price
adjustment that brings trade between the two countries back into equilibrium.
14 For more information, see CRS Report RL31204, Fixed Exchange Rates, Floating
Exchange Rates, and Currency Boards: What Have We Learned?, by Marc Labonte.
become more costly abroad and imports less costly.  At that point, the trade surplus
will return to its equilibrium value. Although the nominal exchange rate never
changed, because of the rise in prices, the real exchange rate would now equal the
market rate that would prevail if the exchange rate had been floating.  Thus,
undervaluing a fixed exchange rate does not confer any permanent competitive
advantage for a country’s exporters and import-competing industries.  However,
because price adjustment takes time, floating exchange rates return to the equilibrium
value much more quickly than fixed exchange rates.
Pros and Cons of a Peg.  Fixed exchange rates have a long history of use,
including the Bretton Woods system linking the major currencies of the world from
the 1940s to the 1960s and the international gold standard before then.  There is little
consensus among economists and policymakers whether floating or fixed exchange
rates are preferable.  Both systems, and the many hybrid systems in between, have
their advantages and disadvantages.  Furthermore, since countries differ so
significantly in their economic and demographic conditions, an exchange rate regime
that suits one country may be unsuitable for another.  Economists identify two main
advantages, one economic and one political, to a fixed exchange rate.14
Economically, a fixed exchange rate provides stability between the country and
the partner to which it is linked.  This reduces risk and uncertainty in the price of
goods, services, and capital between the two countries, thereby fostering greater trade
and capital integration between the two.  China’s focus on attracting foreign direct
investment makes stability particularly appealing.  The drawback to greater stability
is less policy flexibility for the country maintaining the peg, in this case China, to use
monetary and fiscal policy to offset changes in the business cycle (the U.S. loses no
policy flexibility from China’s peg).  For example, a peg would prevent a country
from lowering its interest rates to offset an economic downturn.  If it did, capital
would flow out of the country to assets with higher interest rates in the rest of the
world, and the country would find its currency peg under pressure (since investors
would sell the country’s currency and buy foreign currency to transfer their capital
abroad) until it raised its interest rates.  
This loss of flexibility is relatively unimportant for small countries that fix their
exchange rate to large neighbors that share the same business cycle, since the large
neighbor would also likely be affected by the downturn and lower its interest rates.
But the loss in flexibility is costly when a country is tied to a partner to whom it is
not closely linked and does not experience similar business cycles, as is arguably the
case between the United States and China.  
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However, China mitigates the loss of flexibility that a country with a fixed
exchange rate would normally experience through its use of capital controls (legal
barriers restricting access to foreign currency).  The currency is convertible on a
current account basis (such as for trade transactions), but not on a capital account
basis (for various types of financial flows, such as portfolio investment).  In addition,
nearly all Chinese enterprises are required to turn over their foreign currency holdings
to China’s state bank in exchange for yuan, and purchases of foreign exchange by
individuals and firms in China are closely regulated.  Because capital cannot easily
leave China when interest rates are lowered, China retains some flexibility over its
monetary and fiscal policy despite the fixed exchange rate.  Another drawback to
fixed exchange rates is the possibility of speculative attacks if investors believe that
the central bank is unable to defend the peg.  Capital controls also decrease the
likelihood of speculative attacks, which have been a major proximate cause of
economic crisis in developing countries in recent years, including Southeast Asia,
Argentina, and Turkey.15
Politically, a fixed exchange rate is seen as a way to enhance the credibility of
a country’s monetary authorities by “tying its hands.”  Since a fixed exchange rate
limits a country’s use of discretionary monetary policy, the country is no longer as
free to abuse its monetary discretion.  Notably, the country is less able to use
inflationary monetary policies to stimulate the economy for short-term gain or to
finance government spending that has not been financed through tax revenues.  Many
developing countries with a history of high inflation adopt fixed exchange rates as
a way to “break with the past.”  Once credibility has been established through many
years of price stability, the credibility rationale for a fixed exchange rate becomes less
important.  China’s inflation rate never rose higher than 3.9% between 1997 and
2005 (and in some years was negative), and has never exceeded 24.1% (1994) since
its transition to a market economy beginning in the late 1970s.  When inflation rose
to 3.9% in 2004, the Chinese Central Bank in October 2004 raised its one year
lending rate by a 0.27 percentage point, the first rate hike by the bank in more than
nine years.
Fixed exchange rates do not have to be kept constant when economic conditions
change; they can be revalued and then fixed at a new rate.  Frequent revaluation,
however, diminishes the economic benefit of stability and the political benefit of
credibility (particularly when the exchange rate is devalued, or revalued downward),
which could increase the likelihood of future speculation against the currency.
A Critique of Various Estimates of the Yuan’s Undervaluation
Although it is certain that the yuan would appreciate if the central bank were not
increasing its foreign reserves, since the value of the yuan has been virtually constant
since 1994 there is no direct way to determine how much it would appreciate — even
if there was a consensus about what China’s current account balance should be, there
are no observations since 1994 to estimate how sensitive its imports and exports
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The Case against Japan and China,” in C. Fred Bergsten and John Williamson, eds., Dollar
Overvaluation and the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics, 2003).
17 In addition to the general criticisms of all studies below, there some specific criticisms of
the Preeg estimate.  First, Preeg’s conversion of the rule of thumb from dollar terms to
percentage of the total trade deficit is without justification.  His conversion implies that if
the U.S. trade deficit were $1, a 40% decline in the dollar would lower the deficit by $1.
By that logic, if the trade deficit were $1 trillion, a 40% decline in the dollar would lower
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would be to changes in the exchange rate.  Estimates of the extent of the yuan’s
undervaluation have been cited in many articles and interviews.  This report attempts
to evaluate only those estimates in which the author explains how the estimate was
derived.  It should be noted that many of the estimates were made some time ago, so
the yuan may be more or less undervalued at this point than when the estimates were
made.  The estimates are grouped below into two broad methodological categories:
the “fundamental equilibrium exchange rate” method and the “purchasing power
parity” method.
Estimates Based on Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates.
One method for estimating misalignments in exchange rates is referred to as the
fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) method.  It is based on the belief that
current account balances at the present are temporarily out of line with their
“fundamental” value, either because of unsustainable forces in the economy or
government intervention.  Once an estimate has been made of what the fundamental
current account balance should be, one can calculate how much the exchange rate
must change in value to achieve that current account adjustment.  As will be
discussed below, this is not an uncontroversial method.  Many economists would
reject the notion that current account balances worldwide are misaligned, or that
economists can predictably determine how much they must be adjusted to come back
into alignment.  Thus, the following estimates are only valid if one accepts the
assumptions underlying them.
Ernest Preeg, senior fellow at the Manufacturers’ Alliance, estimates that the
yuan is undervalued by 40%.16  While this claim is not based on any formal analysis,
he uses several rule-of-thumb estimates to reach this conclusion.  His first
observation is that the increase in Chinese foreign exchange reserves equaled 100%
of the Chinese trade surplus less net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in the first
six months of 2002.  He concludes that the entire trade surplus less net foreign direct
investment would be zero in the absence of the increase in foreign exchange reserves.
His second observation is a rule-of-thumb estimate that a 1% decline in the dollar
leads to a $10 billion decline in the trade deficit in the United States  He then
observes that the dollar would need to decline by 40% according to that rule of thumb
to eliminate the trade deficit since the U.S. trade deficit equaled about $400 billion
in 2002.  Since the Chinese trade surplus plus net FDI flows equaled 100% of the
increase in foreign exchange reserves, he concludes that if the central bank no longer
increased its foreign exchange reserves by letting the yuan float, the surplus less FDI
would be zero and the yuan would appreciate by 40%, based on the U.S. ratio.17
CRS-14
17 (...continued)
the deficit by $1 trillion.  Clearly, a 40% decline in the dollar cannot have such different
effects on the trade deficit simply because the dollar value of the trade deficit has changed.
Second, Preeg applies his estimate based on U.S. data to the Chinese trade surplus without
any supporting evidence.  Since the United States and China have different economies,
trading patterns, trade balances, and exchange rate regimes, there is no reason to think the
estimate would be the same for both countries.  He also uses overall and bilateral trade
balances interchangeably.  There is no reason to think that a 40% decline in the dollar would
have the same effect on a $400 billion U.S. overall trade deficit (from which he does not
subtract FDI) as a 40% decline in the yuan would have on a $60 billion bilateral Chinese
trade surplus less FDI.
18 According to the data cited elsewhere in this report, the actual surplus in 2002 was 2.9%
of GDP and 2.2% in 2003.
19 Morris Goldstein, testimony before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, October
1, 2003.
20 Jim O’Neill and Dominic Wilson, How China Can Help the World, Goldman Sachs
Global Economics Paper 97, September 17, 2003.
The Institute for International Economics (IIE) estimates that the yuan is 15-
25% undervalued.  It argues that the “underlying” current account surplus was 2.5-
3% of GDP, larger than the actual surplus (1.5%) (it does not explain why).18  It then
argues that the surplus should be reduced by $50 billion (or 4% of GDP) to return to
equilibrium, which would leave China with a deficit of 1-1.5% of GDP in
equilibrium. It believes that the revaluation required to achieve this reduction in the
current account surplus is unusually large because of the extensive use of imports in
the production of Chinese exports.  IIE Fellow Morris Goldstein testified that 
These estimates of [yuan] misalignment can be obtained either by solving a trade
model for the appreciation of the RMB that would produce equilibrium in
China’s overall balance of payments, or by gauging the appreciation of the RMB
that make a fair contribution to the reduction in global payment imbalances,
especially the reduction of the U.S. current-account deficit to a more sustainable
level.19
Goldman Sachs Economic Research Group has estimated that the yuan is 9.5-
15% undervalued.20  They argue that the current account less FDI should be zero in
equilibrium (which means that China would have a current account deficit equal to
FDI), which could be accomplished with a 9.5-15% revaluation.  This is based on
their elasticity (i.e., the degree to which demand changes due to price changes)
estimates that exports would fall 0.2% and imports would rise 0.5% when the
exchange rate rose 1%.  
Virginie Coudert and Cecile Couharde use more sophisticated analysis to
estimate their parameters.  They argue that China has an underlying current account
deficit of between 1.5% and 2.8% of GDP.  The smaller number comes from a cross-
country regression of the current account balance based on variables such as per-
capita income, demographics, and the budget deficit; the larger number is an estimate
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22 A thorough attempt to estimate exchange rates according to this method can be found in
John Williamson, ed., Estimating Equilibrium Exchange Rates (Washington, DC:  Institute
for International Economics, 1994).
of the largest current account deficit that would stabilize China’s debt-to-GDP ratio.
They estimate that the yuan was 44-54% undervalued against the dollar in 2003.21
All of these estimates are based on a similar logic, so a few general observations
can be made about all of them.  First, none of the estimates are the product of
theoretically grounded, econometrically estimated economic models.  Rather, they
are “back of the envelope” estimates based on a few simple “rule of thumb”
assumptions. “Rules of thumb” such as the Preeg 10%-$1 billion estimate or the
Goldman Sachs import and export elasticities may not be accurate over time or over
large changes in the exchange rate. 
The main source of contention in all of the estimates of the yuan’s
undervaluation is the definition of an “equilibrium” current account balance.  All of
the estimates are based on the appreciation that would be required for China to attain
“equilibrium” in the current account balance.  But there is no consensus based on
theory or evidence to determine what equilibrium would be; rather, the authors base
equilibrium on their own personal opinion, with some using arbitrary assumptions
and others more sophisticated ones.22  Some economists argue that the current
account balance would always be close to zero in equilibrium, but this neglects the
fact that countries with different saving and investment rates may willingly lend to
and borrow from one another for long periods of time.  
In fact, the Preeg, IIE, and Goldman Sachs estimates use an assumption of
equilibrium less favorable to China than the current account balance.  These studies
actually call for balance only in official and portfolio borrowing.  They still allow for
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, which means their estimate of China’s
overall “equilibrium” current account position is actually a deficit.  If they had
chosen balance (the traditional “equilibrium” measure with a fixed exchange rate)
instead of a deficit as their equilibrium benchmark, their estimates of the yuan’s
undervaluation would have been smaller.  Even if portfolio flows are essentially
limited by capital controls at present, it is not clear why requiring the Chinese to
borrow from the rest of the world is any less unsustainable than the current
arrangement where China is lending to the rest of the world.  With capital controls
and net FDI inflows, increasing foreign reserves is the only way that China can keep
its net foreign indebtedness from increasing.  And all measures rule out any
accumulation of foreign official reserves for reasons other than to influence the
exchange rate.  
It is particularly difficult to determine the equilibrium current account balance
in China because of the current presence of capital controls.  If China were to
maintain capital controls after currency reform (if, for example, they revalued the peg
rather than let the yuan float), current account balance may be a reasonable
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25 Sensible rules of thumb for long-term sustainability, such as estimating the current
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assumption.  But if capital controls were eliminated, as is typically the case with a
floating exchange rate, the economic situation would change entirely —
“equilibrium” could now involve persistent borrowing from or lending to the rest of
the world by private Chinese citizens, which would result in a corresponding
persistent trade deficit or surplus, respectively.  If private citizens lent as much to the
United States in equilibrium as the Chinese central bank is currently lending (and
U.S. lending to China remained unchanged), then the equilibrium market exchange
rate would be equal to the current fixed rate, and the trade deficit would remain
unchanged.  If private capital outflows exceeded the current increase in foreign
reserves, the yuan would depreciate.  Since China is a country with both a high
national saving rate and a high investment rate, it is not clear whether China would
be a net borrower (in which case it would run a current account deficit) or lender
(current account surplus) if their currency floated and capital controls were abolished.
This issue is particularly relevant when the equilibrium exchange rate is defined as
“market determined,” since capital controls currently prevent portfolio investment
flows from being market determined.  Barry Bosworth argues that China’s high
internal saving rate is more than sufficient to finance its investment, so it makes
sense for China to offset FDI inflows with official outflows in the form of foreign
reserve accumulation rather than run a current account deficit.  Therefore, he argues,
foreign reserve accumulation should not be considered proof of undervaluation.23
Wang argues that, based on estimates derived from other developing economies,
China’s equilibrium current account surplus may be even larger than the actual
surplus, so the yuan is overvalued.24
The FEER approach is also based on a belief that the overall U.S. trade deficit
is unsustainable, and revaluing the yuan would reduce it.  This goes beyond an
argument that China has fixed the yuan at an artificially low level, and argues that the
dollar, which is market determined against most of its trading partners, is incorrectly
valued.  For example, the Coudert and Couharde estimate that the yuan is 54%
undervalued is based on a corresponding estimate that the dollar was 35%
overvalued, the yen 37% undervalued, and the euro 27% undervalued in 2003.  If
trade and financial markets are rational over the medium run, then the value of the
dollar and the size of the trade deficit are never unsustainable — if they were,
investors would be unwilling to hold U.S. assets and would sell the dollar, and the
trade deficit would decline.  There is no widely accepted theoretical approach to
determining trade deficit sustainability, and prima facie evidence does not suggest
the U.S. trade deficit is unsustainable over the next few years — it has lasted several
years, it did not prevent the U.S. economy from achieving record growth and low
unemployment in the late 1990s, U.S. investment income paid to foreigners is not
large, and there have not been any unusually large or sudden declines in the dollar
since the trade deficit emerged.25  
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account deficit that would keep U.S. assets a constant share of foreign investment portfolios,
need not hold in the short run.  For instance, after a change in fundamentals, current account
deficits may persist for several years as the United States transitions to a new steady state.
Furthermore, if the Chinese central bank stopped buying U.S. assets, and hence
reduced its bilateral trade deficit with the United States, it is not clear that the overall
U.S. trade deficit would fall by a corresponding amount. Other foreigners would still
be free to lend to the United States, which could cause its other bilateral trade deficits
to widen.  Thus, it is not clear that a “fair share” of a reduction in the U.S. trade
deficit can be apportioned to the Chinese.  On the other hand, if China’s overall trade
surplus were eliminated, it might still run a bilateral trade surplus with the United
States.  Even countries with overall trade deficits, including the United States, have
some trading partners with whom they run surpluses and some with whom they run
deficits.
Does international experience suggest what the Chinese current account balance
would be in equilibrium?  The closest comparison is probably to other East Asian
countries, which also grew rapidly and maintained high saving rates in recent
decades.  The experience of these countries is mixed.  From 1980 to 1997, Korea,
Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand typically ran current account deficits,
while Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan (which had already industrialized)
typically ran current account surpluses.  Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, all
of these countries have run large current account surpluses.  This may suggest that
the current economic environment is not conducive to developing world borrowing.
As seen in Table 2, the same combination of large foreign exchange reserves and a
large current account surplus can be seen in several other countries in the region,
even though these countries range in their exchange rate regimes from a float (Japan
and South Korea) to a currency board (Hong Kong).  Compared to its neighbors,
China’s current account balance does not look unusual.
Table 2.  Foreign Exchange Reserves and Current Account
Balance in Selected Asian Countries, 2005
($ billions and as percent of GDP)
Foreign exchange reserves Current account surplus
Billions of $ % of GDP Billions of $ % of GDP
Japan 842.4 18.4% 163.6 3.6%
China 818.9 36.1% 116.1 5.2%
Taiwan 253.3 73.2% 16.2 4.7%
South Korea 210.3 26.2% 16.6 12.0%
Hong Kong 124.5 70.0% 21.3 8.1%
Source:  Economist Intelligence Unit estimates and official Chinese data.
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Estimates Based on Purchasing Power Parity.  There are other
estimates of the yuan’s undervaluation based on the theory of purchasing power
parity (PPP) — the theory that the same good should have the same price in two
different countries.  If it did not, then arbitrageurs could buy it in the cheaper country
and sell it in the more expensive country until the price disparity disappeared.  
One of the simplest estimates based on PPP is the Economist magazine’s Big
Mac Index, which estimated that China’s currency was undervalued by 59% in
January 2006.26  The Economist portrays the Big Mac Index as a “light hearted guide”
to exchange rates, and there are important drawbacks to relying too heavily on it.
The Big Mac Index compares the price of a McDonald’s Big Mac in China and the
United States.  Since a Big Mac in China was 59% cheaper than in the United States,
the index concludes that the yuan is undervalued by that much.  But purchasing
power parity only applies to tradeable goods, and a Big Mac is not tradeable.  In fact,
Li Ong estimates that 94% of the value of a Big Mac comes not from the hamburger
itself, but the services associated with the hamburger.27  These include the wages of
employees serving the Big Mac and the rent of the restaurant in which it is eaten,
both of which are determined by local factors.  Since the hamburger itself is the only
tradeable portion of the Big Mac, only a small fraction of the Big Mac’s value should
be determined by purchasing power parity.  As a result, a Big Mac in New York City
is more expensive than a Big Mac purchased in the U.S. rural south.  Taken literally,
the Big Mac Index would imply that a dollar in the rural south is undervalued
compared to a dollar in New York City.
While PPP is a simple idea that is powerful in theory, it has been proven to be
unreliable in reality:  prices are consistently lower in developing countries than
industrialized countries.  Some economists have tried to estimate what the yuan’s
value would be by attempting to control for predictable divergences from PPP.  Still,
these estimates should be considered with caution — even when sophisticated
modifications have been made, PPP has been shown to help predict exchange rates
only over the long run.  This means that estimates based on PPP would identify any
country’s currency as overvalued or undervalued.
Economist Jeffrey Frankel argues that income level can be regressed on the
exchange rate using a cross-sample of countries to find a predictable relationship
between a country’s income level and its equilibrium exchange rate based on PPP.
By this measure, he estimates that China’s exchange rate was undervalued by 36%
in 2000.28  He speculates that, if anything, the undervaluation has increased since
then.  Coudert and Couharde make a similar calculation for 2003 and estimate the
yuan to be undervalued by 41-51%, depending on what countries are included in their
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sample.29  Frankel acknowledges a number of caveats to this analysis.  First, PPP
only holds over the long run, at best, and financial flows can cause even market-
determined exchange rates to significantly diverge from PPP for several years.
Second, the regression does not control for other factors and only explains 57% of
the variation in the data.  Third, he argues that any adjustment in the exchange rate
should be gradual so as not to be economically disruptive.  He also warns that “It is
not even true that an appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar would have an
immediately noticeable effect on the overall U.S. trade deficit or employment...”30
There should be some theoretical rationale for linking income levels to
exchange rate values; otherwise, the results may represent nothing more than
spurious correlation.  One rationale is called the “Balassa-Samuelson” effect: as
countries get richer, their exchange rates are predicted to appreciate because
productivity growth will be more rapid for tradeable goods than non-tradeable goods.
Since these differences in productivity growth cannot easily be measured directly,
income levels can be used as a proxy.  But if the proxy is not an accurate one, then
neither will be the results.  Another proxy is the ratio of the consumer price index to
the producer price index. When Coudert and Couharde use this proxy over time with
a smaller sample, they estimate that the yuan is 18% undervalued.  Benassy-Quere
et al. regress this proxy and net foreign assets on a panel of the G20 countries and
find the yuan to be undervalued by 47% in 2003.31  Wang also uses this proxy (for
China only), as well as net foreign assets and openness to trade, in a regression, and
finds evidence that the yuan was only modestly undervalued in 2003.32  However, the
authors caution that the price index proxy could be inaccurate for China since many
consumer prices are not market determined.  In addition, they observe that
restrictions on the mobility of labor and capital in China may interfere with the
Balassa-Samuelson effect.33
Trends and Factors in the U.S.-China Trade Deficit
Critics of China’s currency peg often point to the large and growing U.S.-China
trade imbalance as proof that the yuan is significantly undervalued and constitutes an
attempt to gain an unfair competitive advantage over the United States in trade.
However, bilateral trade balances reflect structural causes as well as exchange rate
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effects.  There are a number of other factors at work that are also important to
consider when analyzing the bilateral trade deficit.
First, although China had (according to U.S. statistics) a $202 billion
merchandise trade surplus with the United States in 2005, its overall trade surplus
was $102 billion (Chinese data), indicating that China had a trade deficit of $100
billion in its trade with the world excluding the United States.34   In comparison,
Japan in 2005 had a $82.7 billion trade surplus with the United States (U.S. data on
its trade deficit with Japan) and a $79.7 overall trade surplus (Japanese data),
indicating that Japan had a $3.0 billion trade deficit with the world excluding the
United States.  If the yuan is undervalued against the dollar, it should also be
undervalued against the other currencies, yet China runs trade deficits against some
of those countries.
Second, there is strong evidence to suggest that a significant share of the
growing level of imports (and hence U.S. trade deficit) from China is coming from
export-oriented multinational companies, especially from East Asia, that have moved
their production facilities to China to take advantage of China’s abundant low-cost
labor (among other factors).  Chinese data indicate that the share of China’s exports
produced by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in China has risen dramatically over
the past several years.  As indicated in Table 3, in 1986, only 1.9% of China’s
exports were from FIEs, but by 1996, this share had risen to 40.7%, and by 2005 it
had risen to 58.3%  A similar pattern can be seen with imports:  FIEs accounted for
only 5.6% of China’s imports in 1986, rose to 47.9% by 2000, and to 58.7% in 2005.
FIEs import raw materials and components (much of which come from East Asia) for
assembly in China.  As a result, China tends to run trade deficits with East Asian
countries and trade surpluses with countries with high consumer demand, such as the
United States.35  These factors have led many analysts to conclude that much of the
increase in U.S. imports (and hence, the rising U.S. trade deficit with China) is a
result of China becoming a production platform for many foreign companies, (who
are the largest benefactors from this arrangement) rather than unfair Chinese trade
policies.36   This suggests a fundamental change in trade between China and the
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of China’s currency would likely have only a minor effect on China’s exports to the United
States (since the cost of imported inputs would fall as a result).  See Testimony of Professor
Lawrence J. Lau before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Is China
Playing by the Rules?  Free Trade, Fair Trade, and WTO Compliance, hearing, September
24, 2003.
United States that could affect the bilateral trade deficit independently of the
exchange rate regime. 
Table 3.  Exports and Imports by Foreign-Invested Enterprises
in China:  1986-2005
Year
FDI in





($ billions)$ billions  $ billions
As a % of
total
Chinese
exports  $ billions




1986 1.9 $0.6 1.9% $2.4 5.6% -1.7
1990 3.5 7.8 12.6 12.3 23.1 -10.4
1995 37.5 46.9 31.5 62.9 47.7 -33.8
2000 40.7 119.4 47.9 117.2 52.1 -83.8
2001 46.9 133.2 50.0 125.8 51.6 -83.1
2002 52.7 169.9 52.2 160.3 54.3 -103.1
2003 53.5 240.3 54.8 231.9 56.0 -124.0
2004 60.6 338.2 57.0 305.6 58.0 -162.0
2005 60.3 444.2 58.3 387.5 57.7 201.6
Source: China’s Customs Statistics and U.S. International Trade Commission Dataweb.
The sharp rise in the share of China’s trade by FIEs appears to be strongly linked
to the rapid growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, which grew from
$1.9 billion in 1986 to $60.3 billion in 2005, much of which went to export-oriented
manufacturing, a large share of which was exported to the United States.  Data in
Table 3 indicate that the U.S. trade deficit with China began to increase rapidly
beginning in the early 1990s, roughly the same time that saw a significant rise in FDI
in China and a sharp rise in exports by FIEs.  By comparing exports and imports in
Table 3, one can see that FIEs have little effect on China’s overall trade balance,
since the FIEs import roughly 88% as much as they export.
 Table 4 provides an illustration of how foreign multinational companies appear
to have shifted a significant level of production from other (mainly) East Asian
countries to China.  The table lists data on U.S. imports of computer equipment and
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parts from its major suppliers for 2000-2005.   In 2000, Japan was the largest foreign
supplier of U.S. computer equipment (with a 19.6% share of total shipments), while
China ranked 4th (at 12.1% share).  In just five years, Japan’s ranking fell to 4th, the
value of its shipments dropped by over half, and its share of shipments declined to
7.8% (2005); Singapore and Taiwan also experienced significant declines in their
computer equipment shipments to the United States over this period.  In 2005, China
was by far the largest foreign supplier of computer equipment with a 45.4% share of
total imports.  While U.S. imports of computer equipment from China rose by
327.7% over the past six years, the total value of U.S. imports from the world of
these commodities rose by only 14.2%. This indicates that much of the increase in
U.S. imports of computer equipment and parts from China occurred because
production was transferred from various countries to China. 
Table 4.  Major Foreign Suppliers of U.S. Computer Equipment
Imports:  2000-2005
($ billions and % change)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2000-2005
% change
Total 68.5 59.0 62.3 64.0 73.9 78.2 14.2
China 8.3 8.2 12.0 18.7 29.5 35.5 327.7
Malaysia 4.9 5/0 7.1 8.0 8.7 9.9 102.0
Mexico 6.9 8.5 7.9 7.0 7.4 6.7 -2.9
Japan 13.4 9.5 8.1 6.3 6.3 6.1 -54.5
Singapore 8.7 7.1 7.1 6.9 6.6 5.9 -32.1
Taiwan 8.3 7.0 7.1 5.4 4.1 2.9 -65.1
Source:  U.S. International Trade Commission Trade Data Web.
Note:  Ranked according to top 6 suppliers in 2005.
Third, productivity gains in Chinese exporting firms have increased rapidly in
the past few years, a boost to exports that is unrelated to the fixed exchange rate.  For
example, Chinese export prices have fallen by a cumulative 27% since 1995 in
Chinese prices.
Fourth, the sharp rise in the U.S. trade deficit with China diverts attention from
the fact that, while U.S. imports from China have been rising rapidly, U.S. exports
to China have been increasing sharply as well.  Table 5 lists annual percentage
change in U.S. exports to its top 10 trading partners (in 2005) and to the world for the
period 2000-2005. These data indicate that U.S. exports to China have risen
significantly faster than both total U.S. exports to the world and any other top 10 U.S.
trading partners.   In 2005, total U.S. exports rose by 10.8%, while those to China
rose by 20.5%.  From 2000-2005, total U.S. exports rose by 15.9%, while those to
China grew by 156.4%.  China also went from being the 11th largest U.S. export
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37 In 2000, 2.1% of total U.S. exports went to China; this share increased to 4.6% in 2005.
38 However, obtaining full compliance with China’s WTO commitments to date has been a
problem for the United States. See CRS Issue Brief IB91121, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by
Wayne M. Morrison.
market in 2000 to its 4th largest market in 2005.37  China’s rapid economic growth
and implementation of its WTO commitments is likely to result in continued rapid
growth in U.S. exports to China.38
Table 5.  Percentage Annual Change in U.S. Exports 
to Top 10 U.S. Export Markets:  2000-2005 





Canada  7.6 -7.2 -1.8 5.4 10.8 12.6 19.8
Mexico 28.3 -9.1 -3.9 -0.1 13.7 8.4 7.4
Japan 13.5 -11.7 -10.8 1.2 4.5 1.9 -15.0
China 23.9 18.4 14.6 28.9 22.2 20.5 156.4
United
Kingdom 8.5 -1.9 -18.5 1.9 6.1 7.4 -7.2 
Germany 9.2 3.0 -11.6  8.3 8.8 8.8 16.8
South Korea 21.6 -20.4 1.8 6.7 9.3 5.1 -0.7
Netherlands 13.2 -11.1 -6.1 12.9 17.3 9.1 20.5
France 7.5 -1.8 -4.4 -10.3 24.4 5.5 10.3
Taiwan 27.5 -25.5 1.3 -11.7 24.3 1.5 -9.4
The World 12.6 -6.3 -5.2 4.4 12.8 10.8 15.9
Source:  United States International Trade Commission Dataweb.
Note:  Listed according to the top 10 U.S. export markets in 2005.
Economic Consequences of China’s
 Currency Policy
If the yuan is undervalued against the dollar, as many critics charge, then there
are benefits and costs of this policy for the economies of both China and the United
States.
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39 This generally refers to those reserves that are sterilized (such as through the issuance of
government bonds and the expansion of bank reserve requirements).  According to the IMF,
in 2005, about half of China’s new foreign exchange reserves were sterilized, while the rest
were added to the money supply.  
40 Putting exchange rate issues aside, most economists maintain that trade is a win-win
situation for the economy as a whole, but produces losers within the economy.  This view
(continued...)
Implications of the Peg for China’s Economy
If the yuan is undervalued, then Chinese exports to the United States are likely
cheaper than they would be if the currency were freely traded, providing a boost to
China’s export industries (which employ millions of workers and are a major source
of China’s productivity gains).  Eliminating exchange rate risk through a peg also
increases the attractiveness of China as a destination for foreign investment in export-
oriented production facilities, much of which comes from U.S. firms.  However, an
undervalued currency makes imports more expensive, hurting Chinese consumers
and Chinese firms that import parts, machinery, and raw materials.  Such a policy,
in effect, benefits Chinese exporting firms (many of which are owned by foreign
multinational corporations) at the expense of non-exporting Chinese firms, especially
those that rely on imported goods.  This may impede the most efficient allocation of
resources in the Chinese economy in the long run.
In the short run, a revaluation of the yuan could reduce aggregate spending in
China by raising imports and reducing exports.  Whether or not this would be
desirable depends on the current state of the Chinese economy.  Some observers
argue that the Chinese economy is currently overheating, and revaluation would help
place it on a more sustainable path and prevent inflation from rising.  Others argue
that there is a large pool of underemployed labor in rural China that the exchange rate
peg is helping to absorb.  In this view, revaluation could be economically and socially
disruptive.
The accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves by China may make it
easier for Chinese officials to move more quickly toward adopting a fully convertible
currency (if the government feels it could defend the currency against speculative
pressures).  However, the accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves also
entails opportunity costs for China: such funds could be used to fund China’s
massive development needs (such as infrastructure improvements and pollution
control), improvements to China’s education system and social safety net, and
recapitalization of financially shaky banks (which may have higher rates of return to
the economy than U.S. Treasuries).39
Implications of the Peg for the U.S. Economy
Effect on Exporters and Import-Competitors.  When a fixed exchange
rate causes the yuan to be less expensive than it would be if it were floating, it causes
Chinese exports to the United States to be relatively inexpensive and U.S. exports to
China to be relatively expensive.  As a result, U.S. exports and the production of U.S.
goods and services that compete with Chinese imports fall, in the short run.40  Many
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derives from the principle of comparative advantage, which states that trade shifts
production to the goods a country is relatively talented at producing from goods it is
relatively less talented at producing.  As trade expands, production of goods with a
comparative disadvantage will decline in the United States, to the detriment of workers and
investors in those sectors (offset by higher employment and profits in sectors with a
comparative advantage).  Economists generally argue that free trade should be pursued
because the gains from trade are large enough that the losers from trade can be compensated
by the winners, and the winners will still be better off.  Critics argue that the losses from
free trade are not acceptable as long as the political system fails to compensate the losers
fairly.  See CRS Report RL32059, Trade, Trade Barriers, and Trade Deficits: Implications
for U.S. Welfare, by Craig Elwell.
41 On the other hand, over the long run, the fixed exchange rate encourages trade (and
investment) between the two countries by eliminating exchange rate risk.  In the long run,
the reduced risk could make both imports and exports higher than under a floating system.
42 Testimony of Franklin J. Vargo, National Association of Manufacturers, before the House
Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary,
Trade, and Technology Policy hearing, China’s Exchange Rate Regime and Its Effects on
the U.S. Economy, October 1, 2003.
of the affected firms are in the manufacturing sector, as will be discussed below.
This causes the U.S. trade deficit to rise and reduces aggregate demand in the short
run, all else equal.41  
China has become the United States’s second largest supplier of imports (2005
data). A large share of China’s exports to the United States are labor-intensive
consumer goods, such as toys and games, textiles and apparel, shoes, and consumer
electronics.  Many of these products do not compete directly with U.S. domestic
producers — the manufacture of many such products shifted overseas several years
ago.  However, there are a number of U.S. industries (many of which are small and
medium-sized firms), including makers of machine tools, hardware, plastics,
furniture, and tool and die that are expressing concern over the growing competitive
challenge posed by China.42  An undervalued Chinese currency may contribute to a
reduction in the output of such industries.  
On the other hand, U.S. producers also import capital equipment and inputs to
final products from China.  For example, U.S. computer firms use a significant level
of imported computer parts in their production, and China was the largest foreign
supplier of computer equipment to the United States in 2005.  An undervalued yuan
lowers the price of these U.S. products, increasing their output and competitiveness
in world markets.  And many imports from China are produced by U.S.-invested
enterprises (as discussed above), which benefit from an undervalued peg.
Effect on U.S. Borrowers.  An undervalued yuan also has an effect on U.S.
borrowers.  When the United States runs a current account deficit with China, an
equivalent amount of capital flows from China to the United States, as can be seen
in the U.S. balance of payments accounts.  This occurs because the Chinese central
bank or private Chinese citizens are investing in U.S. assets, which allows more U.S.
capital investment in plant and equipment to take place than would otherwise occur.
Capital investment increases because the greater demand for U.S. assets puts
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43 Some commentators have compared the undervalued exchange rate to a Chinese tariff on
U.S. imports.  One major difference between a tariff and the peg is that a tariff does not
result in any benefit to U.S. consumers, as the peg does.  A more appropriate comparison
might be an export subsidy, which benefits consumers who purchase the subsidized product
at a lower cost, but may harm some domestic firms that must compete against the
subsidized product.    
downward pressure on U.S. interest rates, and firms are now willing to make
investments that were previously unprofitable.  This increases aggregate spending in
the short run, all else equal, and also increases the size of the economy in the long run
by increasing the capital stock.  
Private firms are not the only beneficiaries of the lower interest rates caused by
the capital inflow (trade deficit) from China.  Interest-sensitive household spending,
on goods such as consumer durables and housing, is also higher than it would be if
capital from China did not flow into the United States.  In addition, a large proportion
of the U.S. assets bought by the Chinese, particularly by the central bank, are U.S.
Treasury securities, which fund U.S. federal budget deficits. According to the U.S.
Treasury Department, China (as of December 2005) held $257 billion in U.S.
Treasury securities, making China the second largest foreign holder of such securities
(after Japan).  If the U.S. trade deficit with China were eliminated, Chinese capital
would no longer flow into this country on net, and the government would have to
find other buyers of its U.S. Treasuries.  This would increase the government’s
interest payments, increasing the budget deficit, all else equal.
Effect on U.S. Consumers.  A society’s economic well-being is usually
measured not by how much it can produce, but how much it can consume.  An
undervalued yuan that lowers the price of imports from China allows the United
States to increase its consumption of both imported and domestically produced goods
through an improvement in the terms-of-trade.  The terms-of-trade measures the
terms on which U.S. labor and capital can be exchanged for foreign labor and capital.
Since changes in aggregate spending are only temporary, from a long-term
perspective the lasting effect of an undervalued yuan is to increase the purchasing
power of U.S. consumers.43
U.S.-China Trade and Manufacturing Jobs.  Critics of China’s currency
peg argue that the low value of the yuan has had a significant effect on the U.S.
manufacturing sector, where 2.7 million factory jobs have been lost since July 2000.
While job losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector have been significant in recent
years, there is no clear link between job losses and imports from China.  First, only
some manufacturers export to China or compete with Chinese imports.  Second, the
economic recession and subsequent “jobless recovery” that ended in August 2003
reduced employment across the entire economy.  Third, the “strong dollar” and
growing trade deficit have not been limited to China; the trade-weighted dollar index
was appreciating until early 2002 and the overall trade deficit is still increasing.  
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44 See CRS Report RL32350, Deindustrialization of the U.S. Economy, by Craig Elwell.  A
thorough analysis of the trend can also be found in Robert Rowthorn and Ramana
Rasmaswamy, Deindustrialization: Its Causes and Implications, Economic Issues 10
(Washington, DC:  International Monetary Fund, 1997).
45 Council of Economic Advisers, 2005 Economic Report of the President.
46 From June 2000 to 2004, manufacturing output has fallen by 6% (according to the
Industrial Production Index) while manufacturing employment has fallen by 15.7%.  Thus,
productivity has increased such that fewer workers are needed to produce a given amount
of output.
47 Lower wages alone do not give China a price advantage relative to the United States.  U.S.
workers are much more productive than Chinese workers, and this primarily accounts for
their higher wages.  Lower unit labor costs (wages divided by productivity) determine which
country has a price advantage.  In labor-intensive industries, China is likely to have lower
unit labor costs; in knowledge-intensive industries, the United States is likely to have lower
unit labor costs.
48 Alliance Capital, Management L.P., Alliance Bernstein, U.S. Weekly Economic Update,
Manufacturing Payrolls Declining Globally: The Untold Story, by Joseph Carson, October
10, 2003.  Note that the study attributes most of the job reductions in China in the
manufacturing sector to increased productivity in China.  However, it is likely that the
Chinese government’s restructuring of inefficient state-owned enterprises, and consequent
(continued...)
Finally, there is a long-run trend that is moving U.S. production away from
manufacturing and toward the service sector.44  U.S. employment in manufacturing
as a share of total nonagricultural employment has fallen from 31.8% in 1960 to
22.4% in 1980 to 10.7% in 2005.45  This trend is much larger than the Chinese
currency issue, and is caused by changing technology (which requires fewer workers
to produce the same number of goods)46 and comparative advantage.  With enhanced
globalization, comparative advantage predicts the United States will produce
knowledge- and technology-intensive goods that it is best at producing for trade with
countries, such as China, who are better at producing labor-intensive goods.  Since
the production of some manufactured goods is labor-intensive and some services
cannot be traded, trade leads to more manufacturing abroad, and less in the United
States.47  Over time, it is likely that the trend shifting manufacturing abroad will
continue regardless of China’s currency peg. 
The decline in manufacturing employment is not unique to the United States.
According to a study by Alliance Capital Management, employment in
manufacturing among the world’s 20 largest economies declined by 22 million jobs
between 1995 and 2002.  At the same time, the study estimated that total
manufacturing production among these economies increased by more than 30% (due
largely to increases in productivity).  As indicated in Table 6, while the number of
manufacturing jobs in the United States declined by 1.9 million (or 11.3%) during
this period, they declined in many other industrial countries as well, including Japan
(2.3 million or 16.1%), Germany (476,000 or 10.1%), the United Kingdom (446,000
or 10.3%), and South Korea (555,000 or 11.6%). The study further estimated
employment in manufacturing in China during this period declined by 15 million
workers (from 96 million workers in 1995 to 83 million in 2002), a 15.3%
reduction.48  In the United States and United Kingdom, the employment decline
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large-scale layoffs by such firms, was also a major factor. 
49 Alliance Capital, Management L.P., Alliance Bernstein, U.S. Weekly Economic Update,
Manufacturing Jobs Still Declining in Industrialized Economies, by Joseph Carson,
February 18, 2005.  
50 Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Senate Finance Committee, June 23,
2005.
51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter, November 2003.
began in 1999; in the other countries in Table 6, the decline began earlier.  In 2004,
the industrialized countries experienced a loss of 865,000 more manufacturing jobs,
and a cumulative 6.3 million manufacturing job losses over the previous five years.49
Table 6.  Manufacturing Employment in Selected Countries:
1995 and 2002










United States 17,251 15,304 -1,947 -11.3
Japan 14,570 12,230 -2,340 -16.1
Germany 8,439 7,963 -476 -10.1
United Kingdom 4,402 3,956 -446 -10.3
South Korea 4,796 4,241 -555 -11.6
China 98,030 83,080 -14,950 -15.3
Source:  Alliance Capital Management L.P., Alliance Bernstein, Manufacturing Payrolls Declining
Globally: The Untold Story, U.S. Weekly Economic Update, October 10, 2003.
The sharp increases in U.S. imports of manufactured products from China over
the past several years do not necessarily correlate with subsequent production and job
losses in the manufacturing sector.  Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, testified in 2005 that “I am aware of no credible evidence that supports such
a conclusion...” that “... a marked increase in the exchange value of the Chinese
renminbi relative to the dollar would significantly increase manufacturing activity
and jobs in the United States.”50  A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
estimated that the import penetration by Chinese manufactured products (i.e., the
ratio of imported manufactured Chinese goods to total manufactured goods
consumed domestically) was only 2.7% in 2001.51  The study acknowledged  that,
while China on average is a small-to-moderate player in most manufacturing sector
markets in the United States, it has shown a high growth in import penetration over
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52 According to the study, U.S. manufactured domestic exports declined by 7.5% in 2001
and by 5.6% in 2002.
the past few years, growing by nearly 60% between 1997-2001 (from 1.7% to 2.7%).
However, the study concluded that “the bulk of the current U.S. manufacturing
weakness cannot be attributed to rising imports and outsourcing,” but rather is largely
the result of the economic slowdown in the United States and among several major
U.S. export markets.52
Determining how much of the loss in manufacturing employment is due to
Chinese imports would require sophisticated economic modeling, and is beyond the
scope of this report.  But by making a simple calculation, an upper-bound estimate
can be placed on how much manufacturing job loss can be attributable to Chinese
imports to put the issue in perspective.  If imports have a one-time effect on U.S.
employment, then the relevant figure is the increase in (not the level of) Chinese
imports over the past couple of years.  Between 2000 and 2002, manufacturing
imports from Chinese increased by about $25 billion.  At the same time, U.S.
manufacturing exports to China increased by $5 billion.  If we assumed that every
additional dollar of Chinese manufacturing imports reduced US manufacturing
output by one dollar - a highly unrealistic assumption - and every additional dollar
of manufacturing exports increased manufacturing output, then trade with China can
account for about a 1.5%, or 0.25 million, decline in manufacturing employment
from 2000 to 2002.  Manufacturing employment fell by 11.3%, or 2 million, from
2000-2002, so that trade with China can only explain at most about one eighth of the
total decline in those years.  The Chicago Fed study cites two reasons why the actual
figure would be smaller: 
! the positive economic effects of low-priced Chinese goods on real
incomes in the United States (which enables consumers to purchase
more goods and services, including those from domestic sources);
and 
! the fact that many such products, if they were not made in China,
would be imported from other foreign countries. 
In addition, the actual job loss would be smaller because of the expansion in output
of interest-sensitive industries, which include some manufacturing industries, since
the capital inflow from China lowers U.S. interest rates.
Net Effect on the U.S. Economy.  In the medium run, an undervalued yuan
neither increases nor decreases aggregate demand in the United States.  Rather, it
leads to a compositional shift in U.S. production, away from U.S. exporters and
import-competing firms toward the firms that benefit from the lower interest rates
caused by Chinese capital inflows.  In particular, capital-intensive firms and firms
that produce consumer durables would be expected to benefit from lower interest
rates.  Thus, it is expected to have no medium- or long-run effect on aggregate U.S.
employment or unemployment.  As evidence, one can consider that while the trade
deficit with China (and overall) has widened, the overall unemployment rate has
fallen from 6.3% in 2003 to 4.8% in February 2006.  However, the gains and losses
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53 See Congressional Budget Office, Causes and Consequences of the Trade Deficit, March
2000.
54 Nations that fail to save enough to meet their investment needs must obtain savings from
other countries with high savings rates.  By obtaining resources from foreign investors for
its investment needs, the United States is able to enjoy a higher rate of consumption than it
would if investment were funded by domestic savings alone (although many analysts warn
that America’s low savings rate could be risky to the U.S. economy in the long run).  The
inflow of foreign capital to the United States is equivalent to the United States borrowing
from the rest of the world.  The only way the United States can borrow from the rest of the
world is by importing more than it exports (running a trade deficit).
in employment and production caused by the trade deficit will not be dispersed
evenly across regions and sectors of the economy: on balance, some areas will gain
while others will lose. 
Although the compositional shift in output has no negative effect on aggregate
U.S. output and employment in the long-run, there may be adverse short-run
consequences.  If output in the trade sector falls more quickly than the output of U.S.
recipients of Chinese capital rises, aggregate spending and employment could
temporarily fall.  If this occurs, then there is likely to be a decline in the inflation rate
as well (which could be beneficial or harmful, depending if inflation is high or low
at the time).  A fall in aggregate spending is more likely to be a concern if the
economy is already sluggish than if it is at full employment.  Otherwise, it is likely
that government macroeconomic policy adjustment and market forces can quickly
compensate for any decline of output in the trade sector by expanding other elements
of aggregate demand.
By shifting the composition of U.S. output to a higher capital base, the size of
the economy would be larger in the long run as a result of the capital inflow/trade
deficit.  U.S. citizens would not enjoy the returns to Chinese-owned capital in the
United States.  U.S. workers employing that Chinese-owned capital would enjoy
higher productivity, however, and correspondingly higher wages.
The U.S.-China Trade Deficit in the Context of the Overall U.S.
Trade Deficit.  While China is a large trading partner, it accounted for only about
14.6% of U.S. imports in 2005 and 24.0% of the sum of the bilateral trade deficits.
Over a span of several years, a country with a floating exchange rate can run an
ongoing overall trade deficit for only one reason:  a domestic imbalance between
saving and investment.  This has been the case for the United States over the past two
decades, where saving as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) has been in
gradual decline.53  On the one hand, the United States has high rates of productivity
growth and strong economic fundamentals that are conducive to high rates of capital
investment.  On the other hand, it has a chronically low household saving rate, and
recently a negative government saving rate as a result of the budget deficit.  As long
as Americans save little, foreigners will use their saving to finance profitable
investment opportunities in the United States; the trade deficit is the result.54  The
returns to foreign-owned capital will flow to foreigners instead of Americans, but the
returns to U.S. labor utilizing foreign-owned capital will flow to U.S. labor.
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55 The level of U.S. savings is among the lowest by industrialized nations.  China on the
other hand has one of the world’s highest savings rates.  China’s extraordinarily high
savings rate is largely the result of China’s undeveloped health care system, pension system,
and social safety net.  For example, many Chinese individuals believe they will need to draw
on personal savings to pay for health care if they or a family member had a serious illness.
In addition, an underdeveloped financial system prevents most people from being able to
borrow money for large purchases (such as a car or home), forcing people to rely on savings.
Finally, China’s currency system (by making imports more expensive) is believed to have
a negative effect on domestic consumption.
56 There are three components of national savings: household, government, and corporate.
When the government runs a budget deficit, the government saving rate is negative.
57 In 2004, China was the third largest net capital exporter ($69 billion) after Japan and
Germany.  See, Council of Economic Advisors, 2005 Economic Report of the President,
p. 135.
 China’s situation is very different.  As Table 7 shows, China’s gross national
saving as a percent of GDP (49.8%) is nearly five times greater than the U.S. level
(13.5%).55  The difference in saving is even more pronounced when comparing
household saving ratios (net household savings divided by net disposable income):
China’s ratio is 30.0% compared to -0.3% for the United States.56  Conversely, the
rate of private consumption as a percent of GDP is significantly higher in the United
States (70%) than it is in China (39.9%).  China maintains a higher rate of gross fixed
investment as a percent of GDP than does the United States (44.4% versus 16.7%).
Finally, China’s gross national saving as a percent of its gross national investment
is equal to 112% versus 69% in the United States.  Thus, the United States must
borrow from abroad to fund its investment needs while China has excess saving that
it can invest overseas.57  The net result of these differences can be seen in the data on
current account balances as a percent of GDP: 5.2% for China compared with -6.5%
for the United States.  These data imply that both China and the United States would
need to make fundamental changes to their saving/investment patterns to reduce the
bilateral trade imbalance (as well as the overall U.S. trade deficit and China’s overall
trade surplus) in the long run.  
Some analysts contend that China is moving in this direction, based on a number
of statements by high level officials that China plans to boost consumer spending.
The Treasury Department’s November 2005 report on International Economic and
Exchange Rate Policies stated that a key factor in Treasury’s decision not to
designate China as a country that manipulates its currency was “China’s commitment
to put greater emphasis on sustainable domestic sources of growth, including by
modernizing the financial sector....”  However, others  contend that it will take
several years for China to switch its reliance on exports and domestic investment to
consumption for much of its GDP growth. 
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58 From a foreign policy perspective, some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern over
the high level of U.S. government debt owed to the Chinese government.  
59 For more information, see CRS Report RL30534, America’s Growing Current Account
Deficit: Its Cause and What It Means for the Economy, by Marc Labonte and Gail Makinen.
60 Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy (Institute for International Economics) have
proposed a two-stage solution that incorporates both approaches.  During the first stage, the
yuan would be appreciated by 15%-25%, the currency band expanded to between 5% and
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Table 7. Comparisons of Savings, Investment, and
Consumption as a Percent of GDP Between the United States
and China, 2005
China United States
Gross savings as a % of GDP 49.8 13.5
Household savings ratio 30.0 -0.3
Private consumption as a % of GDP 39.9 70.0
Gross fixed investment as a % of GDP 44.4 16.7
Gross national savings as a % of gross
national investment
112 69
Current account balance as a % of GDP 5.2 -6.5
Source:  BEA and Morgan Stanley.
Economists generally are more concerned with the overall trade deficit than
bilateral trade balances.  Because of comparative advantage, it is natural that a
country will have some trading partners from which it imports more, and some
trading partners to which it exports more.  For example, the United States has a trade
deficit with Austria and a trade surplus with the Netherlands even though both
countries use the euro, which floats against the dollar.  Of concern to the United
States from an economic perspective is that its low saving rate makes it so reliant on
foreigners to finance its investment opportunities, and not the fact that much of the
capital comes from China.58  If the United States did not borrow from China as a
result of the exchange rate peg, it would still have to borrow from other countries.59
Policy Options for the Peg and U.S. Trade Policy
with China
The United States could utilize a number of options to try to induce China to
change its exchange rate policy if U.S. policymakers desired.  Options for currency
reform range from making the yuan fully convertible to keeping the peg but revaluing
the yuan against the dollar by a certain amount.60  Some have suggested widening the
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7%, and the yuan would be pegged to a basket of major foreign currencies (the dollar, the
yen, and the euro).  In the second stage, China would, once it reformed its financial sector,
adopt a managed floating exchange system.  See “Two-Stage Currency Reform for China,”
Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2003.
61 Some economists argue that short-term movements in floating exchange rates cannot
always be explained by economic fundamentals.  If this were the case, then the floating
exchange rate could become inexplicably overvalued (undervalued) at times, reducing
(increasing) the output of U.S. exporters and U.S. firms that compete with Chinese imports.
These economists often favor fixed or managed exchange rates to prevent these
unexplainable fluctuations, which they argue are detrimental to U.S. economic well-being.
Other economists argue that movements in floating exchange rates are rational, and
therefore lead to economically efficient outcomes.
band around the peg and then letting the yuan rise to the top of the band (which
would be equivalent to a one-time revaluation as long as the top of the band was
below the market value).  Options to induce China to reform its exchange rate regime
might include (1) diplomatic efforts to convince China to change the peg; (2)
utilization of U.S. trade laws (such as Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, as
amended, used to respond to unfair foreign trade barriers), which might involve the
threat of imposing unilateral trade sanctions against China; and (3) trying to make a
case before the World Trade Organization (WTO) that China’s currency peg violates
multilateral trade rules. 
Changes to the Peg and Potential Outcomes 
If the Chinese were to allow their currency to float, its value would be
determined by private actors in the market based on the supply and demand for
Chinese goods and assets relative to U.S. goods and assets.  If the relative demand
for the Chinese currency has increased since the exchange rate was fixed in 1994,
then the floating currency would appreciate.  This would boost U.S. exports and the
output of U.S. producers who compete with the Chinese.  The U.S. bilateral trade
deficit would likely decline (but not necessarily disappear).  At the same time, the
Chinese central bank would no longer purchase U.S. assets to maintain the peg.  U.S.
borrowers, including the federal government, would now need to find new lenders
to finance their borrowing, and interest rates in the United States would rise.  This
would reduce spending on interest-sensitive purchases, such as capital investment,
housing (residential investment), and consumer durables.  The reduction in
investment spending would reduce the long-run size of the U.S. economy.  If the
relative demand for Chinese goods and assets were to fall at some point in the future,
the floating exchange rate would depreciate, and the effects would be reversed.
Floating exchange rates fluctuate in value frequently and significantly.61  Over time,
the volatility of the floating rate could reduce the levels of bilateral trade and
investment between the United States and China. 
A move to a floating exchange rate is typically accompanied by the elimination
of capital controls that limit a country’s private citizens from freely purchasing and
selling foreign currency.  Capital controls exist in China today, and arguably one of
the major reasons China opposes a floating exchange rate is because it fears that the
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62 This argument is made in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, “A Modest Proposal for
China’s Renminbi,”Financial Times, August 26, 2003.  Alternatively, if Chinese citizens
proved unconcerned about keeping their wealth in Chinese assets, the removal of capital
controls could lead to a greater inflow of foreign capital since foreigners would be less
concerned about being unable to access their Chinese investments.  This would cause the
exchange rate to appreciate.
63 Another problem for China if the yuan appreciated, whether through floating or a
revaluation, is that it would reduce the value of their U.S. assets.  Since China held $257
billion of U.S. Treasury securities at the end of 2005 and $106 billion of U.S. agency debt
in June 2004 — much of it in the central bank — these capital losses could potentially be
very large.  Unlike a private bank, a central bank does not have to worry about insolvency
as a result of capital losses since they control their liabilities, but it could potentially have
negative fiscal or inflationary ramifications.  See “A License to Lose Money,” The
Economist, April 30, 2005, p. 74.
removal of capital controls would lead to a large private capital outflow from China.
This might occur because Chinese citizens fear that their deposits in the potentially
insolvent state banking system are unsafe.  If the capital outflow were large enough,
it could cause the floating exchange rate to depreciate rather than appreciate.62  If this
occurred, the output of U.S. exporters and import-competing firms would be reduced
below the level prevailing under the fixed exchange rate regime, and the U.S.
bilateral trade deficit would expand.  In other words, the United States would still
borrow heavily from China, but it would now be private citizens buying U.S. assets
instead of the Chinese central bank.  China could attempt to float its exchange rate
while maintaining its capital controls, at least temporarily.  This solution would
eliminate the possibility that the currency would depreciate because of a private
capital outflow.  While this would be unusual, it might be possible.  It would likely
make it more difficult to impose effective capital controls, however, since the
fluctuating currency would offer a much greater profit incentive for evasion.
If the Chinese were to revalue their currency (adjusting the peg) to the rate that
would prevail in the market, the immediate effects on the U.S. economy would be the
same as if the yuan were allowed to float: it would increase the output of exporters
and import-competing firms and reduce interest-sensitive U.S. spending.  The
difference between revaluation and floating would occur over time.  With future
changes in the relative demand for goods and assets, the yuan could again become
overvalued or undervalued.  If it were to become overvalued, it could come under
speculative attack, as happened to Southeast Asian currencies during the Asian
Crisis, since investors would view the government as more willing to alter the
exchange rate.  Revaluing would have the advantage of maintaining exchange rate
stability, which would lead to closer bilateral trade and investment ties than if the
yuan were allowed to float.  (Revaluing would lead to lower bilateral trade and
investment flows compared to maintaining a constant peg, however, since the peg
would now be viewed as less permanent.)  China would also be able to maintain its
capital controls, preventing the possibility of a destabilizing capital outflow by its
private citizens.63
Another option is to maintain the status quo.  Although the nominal exchange
rate would stay constant in this case, over time the real rate would adjust as inflation
rates in the two countries diverged.  As the central bank exchanged newly printed
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64 Some analysts argue that China’s currency peg has induced other East Asian economies,
particularly Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to intervene in currency markets to keep their
currencies weak (in order to compete with Chinese exports).  Thus, the United States could
seek to reach a broad consensus with all the major economies in East Asia to halt or limit
currency interventions.
65 Section 301 to 309 of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended.  For additional information, see
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yuan for U.S. assets, prices in China would rise along with the money supply until
the real exchange rate was brought back into line with the market rate.  This would
cause the U.S. bilateral trade deficit to decline and expand the output of U.S.
exporters and import-competing firms.  This real exchange rate adjustment would
only occur over time, however, and pressures on the U.S. trade sector would persist
in the meantime.
None of the solutions guarantee that the bilateral trade deficit will be eliminated.
China is a country with a high saving rate, and the United States is a country with a
low saving rate; it is natural that their overall trade balances would be in surplus and
deficit, respectively.  At the bilateral level, it is not unusual for two countries to run
persistently imbalanced trade, even with a floating exchange rate.  If China can
continue its combination of low-cost labor and rapid productivity gains, which have
been reducing export prices in yuan terms, its exports to the United States are likely
to continue to grow regardless of the exchange rate regime.
Policy Options to Induce China to Reform the Peg
Diplomatic Efforts.  The U.S. government could attempt to persuade China
through direct negotiations to change or reform its exchange rate policy.  President
Bush and Administration officials have contended that China’s currency policy is bad
for China’s economy, as well as that of its trading partners and world growth as a
whole.   The United States has attempted to assist China in reforming its financial
sector to provide a foundation for further currency reforms.  Alternatively, the United
States could attempt to persuade China to participate in talks with other East Asian
economies (that are viewed as intervening in currency markets) in order to reach a
consensus on exchange rate policy.64 Finally, the United States could press the
International Monetary Fund to become more active in working with China to help
it understand the long-term economic risks of over-relying on exports and domestic
investment for much of its growth, and promote the development of policy tools that
lead to more balanced economic growth (such as more domestic consumption).   A
key factor in any negotiations would be to convince China that liberalization of its
exchange rate system would serve China’s long term economic interests and not lead
to economic instability.
Utilize Section 301.   The U.S. government could attempt to pressure China
by threatening to impose unilateral trade sanctions.  For example, it could threaten
to initiate a Section 301 case, a provision in U.S. trade law that gives the U.S. Trade
Representative authority to respond to foreign trade barriers, including  violations of
U.S. rights under a trade agreement, and unreasonable or discriminatory practices that
burden or restrict U.S. commerce.65  If the United States contended that China’s
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CRS Report 98-454,  Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended: Its Operation and
Issues Involving Its Use by the United States, by Wayne Morrison.
66 For example, some analysts contend that China’s currency policy violates Article XV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreement dealing with exchange
arrangements and  the WTO Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  Other
critics charge the peg violates Article XXIII of the GATT dealing with nullification or
impairment of the benefits of a trade agreement.
67 Dispute resolution in the WTO is carried out under the Dispute Resolution Understanding
(DSU).  See CRS Report RS20088, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization,
by Jeanne J. Grimmett.
68 Many trade analysts argue that countries are more likely to comply with rulings by
multilateral organizations to which they are parties (and whose rules they have agreed to
comply with) than accede to the wishes of another country under the threat of unilateral
sanctions. 
69 USTR press release, November 12, 2004.
currency peg violated WTO rules (see below), it would then have to bring a dispute
settlement proceeding before the WTO.  If the United States contended that China’s
currency policy was not covered under WTO agreements and burdened or restricted
U.S. trade, it could then proceed under the Section 301 mechanism.  This would
involve negotiations with China to remove the trade barrier within a specified time
period, and  potentially, the imposition of  trade sanctions against China (such as
higher tariffs on Chinese goods imported into the United States) if the issue could not
be resolved.   However, China might respond with sanctions against U.S. products,
or it could bring a case against the United States in the WTO, arguing that U.S.
sanctions against China violated WTO trade rules.  
Utilize the Dispute Resolution Mechanism in the WTO.  Some critics
have charged that China’s currency policy violates WTO rules.66  The United States
could file a case before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) against China’s
currency peg.67  If the DSB ruled in favor of the United States, it would direct China
to modify its currency policy so that it complies with WTO rules.  If China refused
to comply, the DSB would likely authorize the United States to impose trade
sanctions against China.  The advantage of using the WTO to resolve the issue is that
it involves a multilateral, rather than unilateral, approach, although there is no
guarantee that the WTO would rule in favor of the United States.68 
In 2004, the Bush Administration rejected two Section 301 petitions on China’s
exchange rate policy: one by the  the China Currency Coalition (a group of U.S.
industrial, service, agricultural, and labor organizations) and one filed by 30
Members of Congress.  Both petitions sought to have the United States bring a case
before the WTO against China in the hope that the WTO would rule that China’s
currency peg violated WTO rules.  The Bush Administration has expressed doubts
that the United States could win such a case in the WTO and contends that such an
approach would be “more damaging than helpful at this time.”69
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70 See CRS Report RS20570, Trade Remedies and the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Accession
Agreement, by William H. Cooper.
71 The U.S. International Trade Commission is in charge of making market disruption
determinations under the safeguard provisions for most products (with the exception of
textiles and apparel, which are handled by the Committee for the Implementation of the
Textile Agreements, an inter-agency committee chaired by the U.S. Commerce Department).
Import relief is subject to presidential approval. 
72 There is also the danger that if China made changes to its peg (such as appreciating the
yuan to the dollar) in order to ease political pressure from the United States, it would expect
something in return, such as easing U.S. pressure on China on other trade issues.
Utilize Special Safeguard Measures.  Another  option might be to utilize
U.S. trade remedy laws relating to special provisions that were part of China’s
accession to the WTO.  For example, the United States could invoke safeguard
provisions (under Sections 421-423 of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended) to impose
restrictions on imported Chinese products that have increased in such quantities that
they have caused, or threaten to cause, market disruption to U.S. domestic
producers.70  This option could be used to provide temporary relief for U.S. domestic
firms that have been negatively affected by a surge in Chinese exports to the United
States (regardless of its cause).71  The sharp increase in textile and apparel imports
from China over the past few years led the Bush Administration on a number of
occasions to invoke the special China textile and apparel safeguard to restrict
imports.   Eventually, the Administration sought and obtained (in  November 2005)
an agreement with China to limit the level of certain textile and apparel exports to the
United States through the end of 2008.   Broadly speaking, any imposed U.S. trade
restrictions of Chinese goods would likely reduce overall U.S. economic welfare,
because the reduction in the welfare of U.S. consumers (as import prices rise) would
likely exceed the increase in welfare of U.S. producers.  
Other Bilateral Commercial Issues
A number of policy analysts have argued against pushing China too hard on its
currency policy, either because it would not serve U.S. economic interests, or because
U.S. pressure would likely be ineffective as long as the Chinese government believed
changing the peg would damage China’s economy.72  Such analysts argue that U.S.
policymakers should address China’s currency policy as part of a more
comprehensive  U.S. trade strategy  to persuade China to accelerate economic and
trade reforms and to address a wide range of U.S. complaints over China’s trade
practices.  Many U.S. firms and policymakers have expressed disappointment with
China’s record on WTO implementation.  Major WTO-related issues of concern to
the United States include market access, inadequate protection of U.S. intellectual
property rights (IPR), industrial policies that promote domestic content over imports,
and indirect subsidization of Chinese state-owned enterprises by China’s banking
system. 
Many analysts contend that an intensified effort toward inducing China to fully
comply with its WTO commitments could result in substantial new trade and
investment opportunities for U.S. firms, and hence could help reduce trade tensions
between the two countries.  In addition, because China’s WTO commitments are
CRS-38
clear and binding, and there is a legal process within the WTO to seek compliance
with trade agreements, the United States is in a stronger position to get China to
liberalize its economy and open its markets than it would be if it tried to push China
to reform its currency regime (where multilateral rules and options on the issue are
less clear).  Finally, supporters of this policy argue that China’s leaders are more
likely to respond to pressures to adhere to international rules of conduct than to
perceived direct U.S. pressure. 
Legislation in the 109th Congress
Several bills have been introduced to deal with foreign exchange rate policies.
Some are aimed specifically at China while others are aimed at countries that are
deemed to manipulate their currencies.  
Bills that Have Seen Legislative Action
! S.Amdt. 309 (Schumer) to S. 600 would impose a 27.5% tariff on
Chinese goods if China failed to substantially appreciate its currency
to market levels. On April 6, 2005, the Senate failed (by a vote of
33 to 67) to reject the amendment,  In response to the vote, the
Senate leadership moved to allow a vote on S. 295 (which has same
language as S.Amdt. 309) no later than July 27, 2005, as long as the
sponsors of the amendment agree not to sponsor similar amendments
for the duration of the 109th Congress.  However, on June 30, 2005,
Senator Schumer and other sponsors of S. 295 agreed to delay
consideration of the bill after they received a briefing from
Administration officials and were told that China was expected to
make significant progress on reforming its currency over the next
few months.  Disappointment over China’s July 2005 currency
reforms led Senator Schumer to push for consideration of S. 295
(under the previous compromise).  On November 16, 2005, the
Senate agreed to consider the bill no later than March 31, 2006.  On
March 28, 2006, Senators Schumer and Graham stated that they
would move to delay taking up S. 295 in the Senate, based on their
assessment during a trip to China that the Chinese government was
serious about reforming its currency policy.
! H.R. 3283 (English) would (among other things) apply U.S.
countervailing laws (dealing with foreign government subsidies) to
non-market economies (such as China); and require the Treasury
Department to define “currency manipulation,”  describe actions that
would be considered to constitute manipulation, and report on
China’s new currency regime. The bill passed (255 to 168) on July




! S. 2467 (Grassley) would require the Treasury Department to engage
the International Monetary Fund and other countries to resolve major
currency imbalances with the dollar and would take specific action
against countries that refuse to promote the fair valuation of their
currency; require the Secretary of Treasury to identify
“fundamentally misaligned currencies” that adversely affect the U.S.
economy; and require the USTR’s office to work more closely with
Congress in identifying and resolving the most serious trade and
investment barriers faced by U.S. firms.
! S. 14 (Stabenow) and H.R. 1575 (Myrick) direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to negotiate with China to accept a market-based system of
currency valuation, and would impose an additional duty of 27.5%
on Chinese goods imported into the United States unless the
President submits a certification to Congress that China is no longer
manipulating the rate of exchange and is complying with accepted
market-based trading policies.  
! H.R. 3004 (English) would require the Treasury Department to
determine if China manipulated its currency and to impose
additional tariffs on Chinese goods comparable to the rate of
currency manipulation.
! H.R. 3157 (Dingell) and S. 377 (Lieberman) direct the President to
negotiate with those countries determined to be engaged most
egregiously in currency manipulation and to seek an end to such
manipulation.  If an agreement is not reached, the President is
directed to institute proceedings under the relevant U.S. and
international trade laws (such as the WTO)  and to seek appropriate
damages and remedies for the U.S. manufacturers and other affected
parties.
! H.R. 2208 (Manzullo), S. 984 (Snowe), and S. 1048 (Schumer) add
changes to the criteria that the U.S. Treasury Department is required
to consider when making a determination on currency manipulation
(including a protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in
the exchange markets) in its bi-annual reports on International
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies.
! H.R. 2414 (Rogers, Mike) would require the Treasury Department
to make a determination whether China’s currency policy interferes
with effective balance of payments adjustments or confers a
competitive advantage in international trade that would not exist if
the currency value were set by market forces.  If such a
determination were made, the President would be required to bring
a WTO case against China to seek across-the-board tariffs on
Chinese goods in order to offset the subsidy effects of
undervaluation. 
CRS-40
73 Chinese officials might put off making further currency reforms out of concern that doing
so would be viewed by as caving into U.S. pressure.
74 Even in cases where jobs have shifted from the United States and China, there are still
questions as to the net impact to the United States.  If the United States is no longer
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! H.R. 1216 (English) and S. 593 (Collins) would apply U.S.
countervailing laws to nonmarket economies. H.R. 1498 (Tim Ryan)
would apply U.S. countervailing laws to countries that manipulate
their currencies.  
! S.Res. 270 (Bayh) expresses the sense of the Senate that the
International Monetary Fund should investigate whether China is
manipulating its currency.
Proponents of legislation threatening to impose additional 27.5% tariffs
(representing the average of various estimates of the yuan’s undervaluation) contend
that such threats were instrumental in moving China to reform and appreciate its
currency policy in July 2005 and hence should be further utilized to press China for
action.  Opponents of such legislation contend that imposing sanctions against China
would violate WTO rules, and that threats of sanctions may over-politicize the issue
and undermine U.S. efforts for further currency reforms.73   Some Members of
Congress support changing U.S. law to apply countervailing laws to nonmarket
economies so that U.S. firms are able to take action against unfair government
subsidies, especially in regards to China.  They further contend that China’s currency
peg constitutes a government export subsidy that should be actionable under U.S.
countervailing laws.  On the one hand, WTO rules allow countries to utilize
countervailing laws to restrict imports of government-subsidized exports.  On the
other hand, it might be difficult for the U.S. government to determine the subsidy
value of China’s currency policy to its exports, and, even if it did, it would be unclear
if subsequent U.S. trade restrictions would be held to be consistent with WTO rules
on countervailing duties.  
Conclusion
The current debate among U.S. policymakers over China’s currency policy has
been  strongly linked to concerns over the growing U.S. trade deficit with China, the
sharp decline in U.S. manufacturing employment over the past few years, and the rise
of China as a major economic power.  Most economists agree that China’s currency
would appreciate against the dollar if allowed to float.  If it did, there is considerable
debate over the net effects this policy would have on the U.S. economy since it may
benefit some U.S. economic sectors and harm other sectors, as well as consumers.
In addition, U.S. trade with China is only one of a number of factors affecting
manufacturing employment, including increased productivity growth, employment
shifts to the service sector, and the overall trade deficit.  It is also not clear to what
extent production in certain industrial sectors has shifted to China from the United
States, as opposed to shifting to China from other low-wage countries, such as
Mexico, Thailand, and Indonesia.74  The extensive involvement of foreign
CRS-41
74 (...continued)
internationally competitive in certain industries, it may be better to shed those industries and
to focus more on economic activities where the United States has a greater comparative
advantage.  The challenge for policymakers is how to help displaced workers get the training
they need to find well-paying jobs that are comparable to or better than the jobs they lost.
75 The World Bank, China: Promoting Growth with Equity, October 13, 2003, p. 9.
76 Political arguments have been made that an economically developed China would become
more peaceful and democratic.  Others argue that an economically stronger China would be
a more dangerous China to U.S. strategic interests.
multilateral corporations in China’s manufactured exports further complicates the
issue of who really benefits from China’s trade, as well as the implications of a rising
U.S. trade deficit with China (since a large share of U.S. imports are coming from
foreign firms, including U.S. firms, that have shifted production from one country to
China).  Thus, there is considerable debate over what policy options would promote
U.S. economic interests since changes to the current  system would produce both
winners and losers in the United States (as well as in China). 
Chinese officials are reluctant to change their currency policy, largely because
it has facilitated economic stability, a contributing factor to China’s rapid economic
growth over the past several years.  Such growth has substantially raised living
standards and reduced poverty.  The World Bank estimates that Chinese economic
reforms have helped lift 402 million people out of poverty (based on a $1 per day
expenditure level).  However, as of 2002, there were still 88 million Chinese living
in poverty.75  China, like many other developing countries, is largely relying on
exporting as a key factor in its economic growth and employment strategy, especially
as it attempts to scale back the involvement of SOEs in the economy.  Chinese
leaders (and many foreign economists) contend that, given the poor state of China’s
banking system, a move toward a fully convertible currency could spark an economic
crisis in China, and could even cause the yuan to depreciate if there were a loss of
confidence in the banking system.  At the same time, however, maintaining the peg
likely entails a number of costs to the Chinese economy.  Thus, in the long run, it is
in China’s own economic interests to reform its banking system and move towards
a fully convertible currency in order to ensure the most efficient allocation of
resources within the economy.  However, it is unclear how quickly China can achieve
these two goals.  
Much of the debate over China’s currency policy is linked to the question of
how China’s economic development is affecting, or will affect, U.S. economic
interests.76  In the past, most U.S.-China trade was considered complementary, that
is, most of the goods the United States imported from China were consumer-oriented,
labor intensive products that were no longer being produced in the United States.  In
recent years, an increasing level of U.S. imports from China have been advanced
technology products.  China has made it a top priority to develop a number of
industries, such as computers and autos, which has raised concerns that the United
States faces a “competitive threat” from China similar to the perceived “competitive
threat” the rise of the Japanese economy in the 1970s and 1980s posed to several U.S.
economic sectors.  The divergent experience of the U.S. and Japanese economies
since the 1990s suggests that the competitive threat from China is questionable.  In
CRS-42
77 A decline in the U.S. terms of trade would mean that prices for U.S. exports would decline
vis-à-vis import prices.  Thus, it would take more U.S. exports to obtain a comparable level
of imports.  A decline in the term of trade implies a relative (but not absolute) loss in
national welfare. 
78 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2005-2006, September 2005.
79 World Economic Forum, Global Information Technology Report 2005-2006, March 2006.
the long run, China’s economic development and exchange rate regime poses little
threat to America’s ability to achieve healthy economic growth and full employment.
For example, as the trade deficit with China has widened, the overall unemployment
rate has fallen below 5%.
A rapidly growing and modernizing Chinese economy would be detrimental to
the United States economically if the United States experienced a significant decline
in its terms-of-trade (the terms on which U.S. labor and capital can be exchanged for
Chinese labor and capital).77  However, a case can be made that the terms-of-trade
would move in favor of the United States as China develops since Chinese markets
for many of the products the U.S. specializes in producing (e.g., services, luxury
goods) are small now, but would presumably expand as Chinese disposable income
continues to rise.  According to the World Economic Forum, the United States
currently ranks as the world’s second most competitive economy (after Finland) in
terms of its ability to sustain long-term economic growth (based on a number of
factors, such as macroeconomic policy, efficiency of public institutions, and
technological development). China ranks 49th out of 117 countries surveyed.78  In
addition, the World Economic Forum ranking the United States as the top country in
the world for information technology, while China ranked 50th out of 115 countries
surveyed.79
Many argue that, because China is becoming such a large player in the world
economy, it must be made to “play by the rules” to ensure a “level playing field” for
U.S. firms and to prevent them from being harmed by unfair Chinese trading
practices.  A major challenge for U.S. policymakers is to pursue macroeconomic and
trade policies that promote economic efficiency and maximize the benefits of trade
for the U.S. economy.
